Emerging market policy makers have been concerned about the financial stability implications of financial globalisation. These concerns are focused on behaviour under stressed conditions. Do tail events in the home country trigger off extreme responses by foreign investors -are foreign investors `fair weather friends'? In this, is there asymmetry between the response of foreign investors to very good versus very bad days? Do foreign investors have a major impact on domestic markets through large movements of funds -are they 'big fish in a small pond'? Do extreme events in world markets induce extreme behaviour by foreign investors, thus making them vectors of crisis transmission? We examine these questions for India, using a modified event study methodology focused on tail events. The results do not support the skeptical perspective on financial globalisation. *
Introduction
The impact of international capital flows on emerging markets has occupied the attention of policy makers and academic economists for many decades. While developing countries have eased capital controls in recent decades, many policy makers continue to be concerned about the problems associated with financial globalisation. Concerns about the problems of financial globalisation in emerging markets have become more prominent after the global crisis, with the suggestion by the IMF that capital controls should be viewed more favourably under certain situations, as compared with the previous view that capital controls were an inadmissible tool of economic policy.
A significant international finance literature has explored the role of foreign investors in emerging markets, with an emphasis on whether foreign investors are a 'stabilising' or a 'destabilising' influence in emerging equity markets. This literature has emphasised two alternatives. Foreign investors could trade in a manner that pushes away from fundamental value (in which case they are viewed as 'destabilising'). Alternatively, foreign investors forecast prices better than domestic investors, and thus enhance market efficiency (in which case they are viewed as 'stabilising'). A considerable literature has developed on these questions, with mixed results.
The motivation for this paper lies in the distinction between this literature, and the concerns of policy makers in emerging markets. Emerging market policy makers are concerned about the financial stability consequences of foreign portfolio flows. However, their notions of stability may differ considerably from those expressed above. Four questions about the financial stability implications of foreign investment flows appear to be of interest from the viewpoint of policy makers in emerging markets:
1. Do foreign investors exacerbate a domestic crisis by withdrawing capital on a large scale?
3. Are foreign investors big fish in a small pond -do their large transactions kick off substantial temporary mean-reverting distortions in the equity or currency market of an illiquid emerging market?
4. When there are stressed conditions in the global financial systems, do foreign investors withdraw capital on a large scale, and thus act as a vector of crisis transmission?
Alternative answers to these questions could potentially be consistent with alternative findings in the existing international finance literature. As an example, emerging market policy makers care about flight of foreign capital in a domestic crisis -regardless of whether or not it brings prices closer to fundamental value. In this sense, these questions are distinct from those which have occupied the existing literature. Further, the questions of interest to policy makers are focused almost exclusively on behaviour in extreme events, specifically, on the behaviour of foreign investors when there are extreme events either in the domestic or in the global economy.
In the existing literature, many studies have examined the interaction between foreign investors and emerging economy stock markets through estimation of linear relationships in the data (e.g. using VARs or VECMs). The estimated parameters then reflect the overall average relationship. However, there may be an ordinary regime, i.e. the behavior of foreign investors on ordinary days, and alongside it there may be different behavior in the tails. In the policy discourse, the concern is seldom about the overall average effects, but about the behavior under stressed conditions. If extreme behaviour by foreign investors is found in the tails, this is relevant to policy makers, regardless of what the overall average estimates show. Estimators of the average behaviour under various scenarios may tend to give misleadingly reassuring answers by underplaying extreme behaviour in the tails. On a related note, the estimation of linear models on the overall data may yield benign results, but this may involve masking nonlinearities in the tail response which need to be uncovered and brought into the policy discourse.
The contribution of this paper lies in directly addressing the above four policy-relevant questions, about the financial stability implications of foreign investors in an emerging market. Our methodology focuses on extreme events, allowing for the possibility that what happens in stressful market conditions may differ from day-to-day outcomes, and measures relationships of interest under stressful conditions. While the behavior associated with extreme events can be estimated through parametric models, we adapt a non-parametric 'event study' methodology. As an example, we identify events consisting of extreme movements of the domestic stock market index. Surrounding these dates, we analyse the fluctuations of foreign investment using the event study methodology. This gives us evidence about the inter-linkages between foreign investment and stock market fluctuations in the tails, without needing to assume linearity.
The findings of the paper, for India, are relatively benign. We find that on very good days in the local economy, foreign investors exacerbate the boom by bringing in additional capital. However, there is asymmetric behaviour and on very bad days in the local economy, no significant effects are found. Foreign investors exacerbate the boom on very good days in India, and are effectively indifferent to very bad days. Foreign investors do not seem to be big fish in a small pond: extreme days of foreign investment in India do not kick off short-term price distortions with mean-reversion in following days. Finally, very positive days on the S&P 500 trigger off additional capital flowing into India, but there is no evidence of the reverse: international crises (with very poor days for the S&P 500) do not trigger off exit by foreign investors. Foreign investors are not a vector of crisis transmission.
The contribution of this paper lies in directly addressing the financial stability concerns of emerging market policy makers, about foreign portfolio flows on extreme days, through a new approach focusing on tail behaviour. While the results for one large emerging market -Indiaare relatively benign, it could well be that in other countries, different results are obtained; it would be surprising if the behaviour of foreign investors in extreme events is the same across all countries. Alongside cross-sectional variation by country, there may also be substantial crosssectional variation in the impact of foreign investors upon different securities within a country. Foreign investors may not be big fish in a small pond when analyzing the Indian stock market index -but such problems may be present either with illiquid Indian securities or with the stock market indexes of countries with less liquidity on the equity market. Both these dimensions constitute important possibilities for future research.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we summarize several strands of literature that are relevant for our analysis. We discuss a few key studies that empirically analyze the relationship between foreign institutional investment and stock market performance in India, using linear parametric methods. We also discuss recent examples of event studies in the context of international trade and capital flows more broadly. Finally, we relate our approach to an existing literature in finance on international information transmission in financial markets. Section 3 gives an overview of the data and the event study methodology. Section 4 presents our results, and Section 5 offers a summary conclusion.
Related Literature
The question of impacts of capital flows by foreign institutional investors ("FII") 1 has exercised policymakers in India for some time, and attracted corresponding academic attention. A variety of authors have approached these questions using vector autoregressions (VAR). Chakrabarti (2001) uses monthly and daily data to estimate a VAR and test for Granger causality. He concludes that in the post-Asian crisis period, Indian stock market performance was the sole driver of FII flows in and out of India, though there may have been some reverse causality in the pre-Asian crisis period. Similar results were obtained by Mukherjee et al. (2002) , using daily data from 1999-2002. Those authors also found an asymmetry between selling by FIIs and buying, with only the former being driven by returns. Gordon and Gupta (2003) analyzed monthly data over the period 1993-2000 and found that FII flows were negatively related to lagged stock market returns, suggesting negative feedback trading. However, monthly data may not be appropriate for identifying such effects (e.g., Rakshit, 2006 In fact, shocks to net FII flows do not feed through to any of the other four variables, whereas positive shocks to the exchange rate, ADR premium and S&P 500 all affect net FII flows. As is the case for the other models surveyed above, this paper also uses a linear times series model, therefore not distinguishing between "normal" and "extreme" days on the market.
There is a significant literature on the role of information transmission in international portfolio flows. For example, Ramadorai (2001, 2008) directly examine the forecasting power of international portfolio flows for local equity markets, attempting to attribute it to either better information about fundamentals on the part of international investors, or to price pressure irrespective of fundamentals. Their data is consistent with the information story, but not the price pressure story. They do, however, find evidence of trend following in cross-border flows based on absolute, though not relative, returns. Therefore, international portfolio flows seem to be stabilizing with respect to notions of relative, but not absolute, value.
On the other hand, different analyses, including that of Stulz (1998, 2001) , find that other data is more consistent with the price pressure story. A very recent example of this conclusion is the work of Jotikasthira, Lundblad and Ramadorai (2011) , who note that movements in outside investors' flows to developed-country-based global funds force significant changes in these funds' portfolio allocations to emerging markets. These forced portfolio allocation shifts drive temporary movements in emerging market equity returns. They find that the data are consistent with performance chasing by outside investors and 'push' effects from the home country, rather than to any private information about emerging market returns.
Given the possibility that multiple factors can drive international investor behavior, in our analysis, we side-step the issue of precise causes of observed connections between foreign equity flows and domestic stock returns. While policymakers will ultimately be interested in causes, their first-order concern is with the strength of the relationship between foreign flows and domestic market returns. Moreover, their interest is not so much in the normal or average relationship, but in what happens in extreme cases. It is precisely the relationship in extreme circumstances that matters for policymakers concerned about potential crises and crisis responses. Therefore, our novel contribution is in focusing on relationships in extreme circumstances, rather than in precisely identifying the drivers of those relationships, though that will be an important subsequent step for this line of research.
The contribution of this paper lies in looking beyond the overall average relationships, by focusing on extreme events, and adapting an event study methodology for the purpose of answering the questions that emerging market policy makers are concerned about with regard to extreme events.
The event study is a workhorse of empirical financial economics. Event studies were originally conceived of in the context of the impact of public announcements on stock returns. Precursors of the modern event study approach focused on stock splits (Dolley, 1933; Myers and Bakay, 1948) . The current style of analysis can be traced back to Fama et al. (1969) and Brown and Warner (1980) . In these and other similar studies, the variable of interest is a price or rate of return, such as a stock price, exchange rate, or bond price. The event of interest can be a merger, earnings announcement or regulatory change. Performance before and after the event is statistically examined. For example, abnormal movements in a stock price before a merger announcement can indicate the use of insider information, or leakage of the news to the market. The event study methodology as implemented here has two key strengths. First, it imposes no functional form upon the responses surrounding event date: the data guides a non-parametric functional form about effects before and after event date. Second, there is a clear causal interpretation interlinking news, event, and financial market responses.
While the event study methodology was invented for analyzing high frequency financial returns, it has been extended to an array of fields including the study of households, firms and countries. More recently, event studies have been applied to the behavior of quantities as well as prices.
Two recent studies are noteworthy in the context of our research, since both focus on international capital flows. Broner et al. (2010) study finds that crises do matter, and affect the behavior of foreign and domestic investors differently but predictably. On the other hand, the IMF study finds little impact of capital control introductions on capital inflows. Hence, an event study can provide useful information whether or not the event in question has "significant" effects on the variable of interest: results do not have to be "significant" to be of interest. 
Data and Methodology
We use daily data for Indian stock market returns, net FII inflow, the US S&P 500, and the VIX. We also observe the `call money rate', as a measure of the domestic interest rate. This data is available for the period 15 February 2000 to 29 July 2011, a period of more than 11 years, giving 3561 observations.
FII Data
FIIs in the Indian context can include a range of financial institutions, including banks, asset management firms, hedge funds and even trusts and foundations. Qualified FIIs are registered with India's stock market regulator, the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI). FIIs are required to settle through custodian banks. Custodian banks are required to supply data to the government, and this is the source of our data. This yields a daily time-series of the activities of foreign investors on the equity market. The raw data is shown in Figure 1 . This data is clearly non-stationary, reflecting the dramatic growth of India's equity market in this period, owing to which the dollar value of foreign investment has risen sharply. To correct for this, we divide this by the market capitalization of the CMIE Cospi index. This yields Figure 2 (the units of the vertical axis are further multiplied by 10,000), which suggests that the scaled series (FII/MktCap) is stationary. This is confirmed by standard tests for stationarity.
Summary statistics for the rescaled FII variable, as well as the other variables in the study, are given in Table 1 . The FII series also displays strong autocorrelation. 4 These are defined to be "countries where the crisis did not originate, with the primary challenge being an upside risk of inflation expectations in goods and asset markets." They include the emerging market economies, as well as several developed economies. 5 Other examples that apply the event study methodology to international trade and finance questions include Pynnonen (2005) and Manova (2008). 
Stock Market Data
Our analysis uses the `Nifty' stock market index for India, and the S&P 500 index for the US. Each of these indexes dominates the index derivatives and index fund industries of its respective country. In each case, the daily index is used to calculate daily returns. In the case of holidays, we assume that the index remains the same for the holiday, implying a zero return for such days. This allows us to avoid problems which arise from the fact that there are different holidays in the two markets. Furthermore, in lining up Indian and US data, while for a particular calendar date, the Indian market is open before the US market, and closes before the US market opens, the likely chain of causality runs from the US market to the Indian market. Therefore we line up the previous calendar day of US data with the Indian data.
We also use data on the VIX to measure forecasted stock market volatility for the S&P 500, and more generally, a measure of uncertainty about the world economy. The emerging markets finance literature has repeatedly found that the VIX plays an important role in shaping required returns in emerging markets. Hence, one might conjecture that high volatility in the US market, as a signal of global risk concerns, might lead to FIIs withdrawing money from emerging markets. We define "very good" days for the VIX as events where volatility, as measured by the VIX, dropped sharply. Conversely, "very bad" days on the VIX are ones where volatility rose sharply.
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Interest and Exchange Rates
Our main interest is in the behavior of FII flows and the stock market, but policymakers are also concerned with the response of interest rates and exchange rates to sharp movements in FII flows. 7 The interest rate we use is the call money rate, expressed as a percentage per annum rate.
The rate used is a weighted (by volume of trades) average of rates for all reported trades, as 6 If one uses levels of the VIX, then "very good" days are ones with very low volatility, whereas "very bad" ones are high volatility days. We did consider this alternative, and discuss it briefly in the context of our results on the VIX in the next section. 7 We are grateful to Subir Gokarn for emphasizing this point.
calculated by the Reserve Bank of India. We also use first differences to deal with nonstationarity. The exchange rate is simply the nominal Rupee -US Dollar rate. Again, we use percent changes in the rate to avoid non-stationarity. Negative changes are therefore cases of nominal appreciation of the Rupee against the US Dollar.
Event Definition
In the traditional event study in finance, the event is an identifiable action at a specific point in time, such as an announcement of a merger or stock split. In more recent applications, events may also be more spread out, such as trade liberalization or introductions of capital controls.
Hence, an event window may not coincide with the time unit of the data. In addressing the questions faced in this paper, we define event dates as those on which extreme values of returns or flows are observed. As an example, we would scan the time-series of returns on the S&P 500, and identify the dates on which one-day returns were in the tails.
This approach is unlike that seen with the typical event study paper, in that the definition of the event is one of the choices faced in devising the estimation strategy. How extreme should our extreme cases be? We might define extreme values to be those in the upper and lower 2.5% tails of the distribution. This would be in keeping with the statistical tradition of using 5% as the standard level of significance in hypothesis testing. However, in this application a different perspective is appropriate. The choice of the tail probability reflects a tradeoff between identifying the truly extreme events (which is favoured by going out into the tails) versus adequacy of data size. There are two further issues to consider. First, matters are complicated by the fact that such extreme (tail) values may cluster: for example, there may be two or three consecutive days of very high or very low daily returns, or these extremes may occur in two out of three days. If the extreme values are all in the same tail of the distribution, it might make sense to consider the cluster of extreme values as a single event.
We approach this problem through two paths. The main results of the paper are based on fusing all consecutive extreme events, of the same direction, into a single event. In event time, date +1 is then the first day after the run of extreme events, and date -1 is the last day prior to the start of the cluster. This strategy avoids losing observations of some of the most important crises, which involve clustered extreme events in the same direction.
The second issue is the length of the period of interest around each event. In the case of announcing a merger or a policy change, there might be interest in some period before the event (to examine whether the information was leaked or the event was somehow anticipated), and some other period after the event (to examine the impact of the event on subsequent behavior). In all these examples, as well as in our case, there is some degree of arbitrariness in the choice of the pre-event and post-event periods. Again, the issue of clustering determines our choice, and we go with pre-event and post-event windows of five market days each, that is, a calendar week each. Five days seems a sufficiently long time in the context of stock market data to pick up either anticipatory or reactive movements for extreme events.
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At the same time, the interpretation of event studies is cleanest when there is no other extreme event in the pre-event or post-event window. In order to address this, as an alternative approach, we isolate what we term as "uncontaminated" single-day events where, within the pre-and postevent windows, there is no other event. Once again, this leads us to choose the relatively short five-day windows, to increase the number of uncontaminated occurrences of extreme events. As noted, we also increase their number by choosing 5% tails rather than 2.5% tails of the distributions. For example, in the case of NIFTY returns, these choices give us 65 events in the upper 5% tail, where there is no other event in the five days on either side of the event. These alternative results are presented as a sensitivity analysis. Table 3 summarizes the number of events that we obtain in this manner, for each of the three main variables -NIFTY returns, S&P 500 returns and normalized net FII flows -as well as the three subsidiary variables. Roughly 60% of the 99 or 100 extreme events in each tail are uncontaminated, in the sense of there not being another tail event in the pre-event or post-event window. The resulting sample sizes of 36 to 66 for the main variables are sufficiently large to obtain considerable statistical precision, as is demonstrated ahead.
Methodology
Early event studies, which were focused on stock market returns on individual firms, used a regression-based approach for identifying abnormal returns. An estimation window that precedes the event is used to estimate a relationship between individual stock returns and some explanatory variable, typically market returns. This relationship is then used to calculate residuals from the pre-event or post-event window, and these residuals (individually or cumulatively) are subjected to a statistical test to see if they are significantly different from zero. The advantage of dealing with market model residuals, rather than raw returns, is that to the extent that the systematic factor (the stock market index) is controlled for, there is a reduction in variance, which improves the precision of the event study. In this paper, such adjustment is not feasible since the object of interest is not features about individual firms but the overall macro time-series. It must be emphasised that controlling for other factors is only a tool for increasing statistical precision. Whether adjustment is done or not does not undermine the basic logic of an event study.
Inference procedures in traditional event studies were based on classical statistics. Subsequently, there have been concerns raised about the distributional assumptions required for this procedure, including normality and lack of serial correlation. It has been demonstrated that serious biases can arise in inferences based on standard assumptions. One method for obtaining superior inference lies in harnessing the bootstrap.
Here we focus on a bootstrap approach to statistical inference for our extreme events. The choice of this approach influences our choices of pre-event and post-event windows, and of the probability value of the tails, as discussed earlier in this section. The bootstrap approach avoids imposing distributional assumptions such as normality, and is also robust against serial correlation -the latter being particularly relevant in the context of FII flows. 11 The precise methodology is as follows: 12 1. Suppose there are N events. Each event is expressed as a time-series of cumulative returns (CR) (or cumulative quantities in the case of FII flows) in event time, within the event window. The overall summary statistic of interest is the CR , the average of all the CR time-series. 2. The bootstrap stage consists of sampling with replacement at the level of the events. Each bootstrap sample is constructed by sampling with replacement, N times, within the dataset of N events. For each event, its corresponding CR time-series is taken. This yields a time-series CR which is one draw from the distribution of the statistic. 3. This procedure is repeated 1000 times in order to obtain the full distribution of CR .
Percentiles of the distribution are shown in the graphs.
To the extent there is a difference between normal times and tail events, this methodology will provide a glimpse into the behaviour of foreign investors during crises. The standard event study approach using benchmark market models can be studied within this framework. To examine this, we take a random sample of 90 days (the average number of events across different variables of interest) from this eleven-year period, and treat these days as "events". Figure 3 shows that there is no discernible impact of FII on the benchmark index in normal times, and the width of the confidence interval also remains significantly flat throughout the event window. This Monte Carlo experiment also suggests that the 95% confidence interval for the cumulative FII investment, in the event window, is fairly tight with a width of roughly 1 basis point of market capitalization. This suggests that effects of larger than 1 basis point are likely to be discernible.
Before turning to the results, we summarize precisely how we use the data and the event study approach to analyse the four questions we posed in the introduction.
Do foreign investors exacerbate a domestic crisis by withdrawing capital on a large scale?
We analyse this question using an event study which measures the behaviour of foreign investors surrounding extreme events for the domestic stock market index.
Is there asymmetric behaviour, with different responses to very good versus very bad days in the local economy?
We measure this by conducting separate event studies for very positive and very negative days for the local stock market index.
Are foreign investors big fish in a small pond -do their large transactions kick off substantial temporary mean-reverting distortions in an illiquid emerging market?
We measure this by conducting an event study where extreme events are defined as days with very positive or very negative foreign capital inflows, and observe the outcomes for the domestic stock market index.
Finally, when there are stressed conditions in the global financial system, do foreign investors withdraw capital on a large scale, and thus act as a vector of crisis transmission? We measure this by conducting an event study focusing on extreme days in terms of the S&P 500 or the VIX, and focus on the outcomes seen in terms of foreign capital inflows and the domestic stock market index.
Results
For each type of 11-day window (the event and five days before and after), we construct a confidence interval for cumulative values.
13 Figure 4 shows the results for the case where the extreme events are NIFTY returns, and the responses of net FII flows are considered. There is some evidence that FII flows lead extreme positive NIFTY returns, since the confidence interval is already above zero the day before the extreme event. Furthermore, there is evidence of persistence after the event: net FII flows stay positive, and the cumulative graph maintains an upward slope. This can be interpreted as positive feedback trading: FIIs seem to be momentum traders, responding to strong positive Nifty returns over the next few days with purchases in India. On the other hand, the pattern for extreme negative NIFTY returns is quite different. The negative extreme value is not preceded by negative FII flows, nor is it followed by further negative flows. The confidence interval for the 11-day window always includes zero.
These results suggest that there is not a simple relationship between NIFTY returns and FII flows. Even though the relationship here is not strictly causal (both variables could be moving because they are jointly affected by some exogenous variable), the difference in pattern between negative and positive cases suggests that there is not a single explanation in terms of information transmission or of price pressure: such general explanations should not depend on the sign of the movements.
14 From the perspective of a policymaker worried about FII outflows in response to very bad days in the Indian stock market going on to trigger a crisis, there is no evidence from this data and analysis that such a problem has occurred over this period. Thus, the casual perceptions of the dangers of "hot money" in the context of FII flows do not find empirical support here. On the other hand, those who have been concerned about excessive inflows might argue that there is evidence for this in left hand side of Figure 4 . NIFTY returns rise before the very good day for FII flows. This is likely to reflect both foreign investors and the stock market responses to good news. However, on days after a strong Nifty return, foreign investors continue to bring fresh capital into India. Together with the previous case, the data seem to be consistent with FII flows tending to "follow" the Indian market when the market is going up. Very bad days for FII flows, i.e., large outflows, do not seem to be preceded by large drops in Indian stock market returns, 15 nor do they seem to trigger further negative returns, since the cumulative graph is relatively flat after the sharp outflow. On the day of such sharp outflows, there is a large drop in Nifty (reflecting that both Nifty and foreign investors respond to news), but it does not get exacerbated in subsequent days. Consistent with the interpretation of Figure 4 , the pattern in Figure 5 does not suggest that sharp declines in FII flows trigger large and persistent domestic stock market declines. However, the question of causality remains. Hence, it is useful to examine how FII flows respond to extreme values of an exogenous variable. S&P 500 returns are an obvious choice for capturing the impact of global shocks. To the extent that the US stock market is the most globalized and responsive to new information, S&P 500 returns can be considered to aggregate this global information. Furthermore, the size of the US market makes it unlikely to be affected by the Indian market, or by FII flows in and out of India. Figure 6 shows the response of FII flows to extreme events as measured by S&P 500 returns. The pattern in response to positive shocks is similar to that observed in Figure 3 . There is less evidence of FII inflows preceding large increases in S&P 500 daily returns than in the case of NIFTY returns, but there is a similar pattern of persistence in FII inflows after such increases. In the case of very bad days on the S&P 500, there does not seem to be any marked impact on FII flows, the pattern being not dissimilar to the "response" to very bad days for the NIFTY index. Turning to the impact of changes in volatility of the US stock market, as another possible indicator of global sentiment or information aggregation, Figure 8 shows the response of FII flows to "very bad" (large increases) and "very good" (large decreases) days for the VIX. When the VIX is decreasing, there appears to be some presaging of this in FII inflows, which is consistent with a view that flows to emerging markets are supported by a more stable perceived environment. On the other hand, the response of FII flows to sharp increases in the VIX is not in line with this view, since even when the VIX is increasing, FII inflows appear to be strong, with some persistence after an extreme increase. Note that the sign of FII flows is similar across Figures 6 and 8 , but the significance and cumulative impact appear to be quite different in considering US stock market returns ( Figure 6 ) versus volatility (Figure 8 ).
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Figure 8: Extreme event on VIX and response of FII Finally, we explore the "knock-on" impacts of FII flows on other variables of interest to macroeconomic policymakers. We have argued that the evidence does not suggest that extreme events, either exogenous (as measured by the behavior of the US stock market) or endogenous (as measured by the Indian market) trigger extreme responses by FIIs that would lead to a crisis; nor does FII behavior in extreme situations (large inflows or outflows) trigger precipitous changes in the Indian stock market. If we turn to the effect of large FII inflows or outflows on interest rates and exchange rates, we do see some impact on the latter, in the expected directions.
We also examined the response of FII net flows to extremes of levels of the VIX. There did not appear to be any significant impacts in either direction, i.e., very high or very low volatility did not appear to be associated with unusual levels of FII flows. Figure 9 shows the behavior of the call money rate around extreme movements of FII flows. Exceptionally large FII inflows (the left hand side of the figure) have imperceptible effects on the interest rate. Large FII outflows appear to be followed by some rise in interest rates, but the confidence interval grows very wide, and therefore this effect is uncertain. It must also be borne in mind that endogenous policy responses to sharp FII outflows could be part of the phenomenon being observed, rather than a pure market response.
Figure 9: Extreme event on FII and response of call money rate
In the case of the exchange rate, the impacts of extreme FII inflows or outflows are as expected. Large inflows are associated with appreciation of the Rupee, whereas large outflows are associated with depreciation. The impacts are somewhat asymmetric, since appreciations tend to cumulate, both before and after the event. In the case of outflows ("very bad" days for FII flows), the depreciation appears to precede the extreme event, but there is no persistence, since the graph is flat in the days following the event. Interestingly, the period of our analysis includes several changes in the Reserve Bank of India's approach to exchange rate management, in the direction of greater flexibility of a managed float. Our results do indicate that capital flows affect the exchange rate, which is unsurprising. However, they do not support a view that large inflows or outflows trigger a panic with respect to the currency. Our main results, presented above, have fused a cluster of extreme events (of the same sign) into one. Through this, date +1 in the event study is always the first date after the last extreme event.
As part of sensitivity analysis, we focus only on uncontaminated events: on a single day where an extreme event is observed, but no other day in the event window is an extreme event. These results are presented in the Appendix. The results are qualitatively similar to those shown above.
Conclusions
While India has gradually decontrolled the capital account from 1992 onwards, there has been a spirited debate about the wisdom of allowing large FII inflows to India. Some have asserted that FII inflows constitute a threat to the Indian economy. At other times, concerns have been expressed about the damage caused by sharp FII outflows. There are complex issues of impacts on the exchange rate, exports, and inflation, but a major fear is also that sharp inflows and outflows destabilize the Indian stock markets. While policymakers have been much less concerned with the dangers of inflows, arguing that they can be managed properly as well as contribute to domestic growth, the basic empirical question of impacts of portfolio flows on domestic equities, and whether they have been factors in triggering bubbles and crashes, remains to be answered. This paper provides a first step in building the empirical underpinnings necessary for informed policy debate.
An existing literature has analysed these relationships using linear models (vector autoregressions). These reflect the overall average relationships across ordinary times and stressed times. The contribution of this paper lies in focusing on extreme events. Our results indicate that there may be some persistence of inflows when the Indian stock market does exceptionally well, but the pattern may reflect global factors, since a similar phenomenon occurs when the US stock market is rising strongly. On the other hand, there is no evidence in this data that sharp FII outflows destabilize the Indian stock market, in the sense of leading to further, cumulative declines in the market.
At this stage, our results are merely suggestive of possible impacts of FII flows on the movement of the Indian stock market, or of effects in the opposite direction. In our main analysis, we have defined extreme events to capture clusters of bad or good days. For a basic sensitivity analysis, we eliminated all cases of overlap in our choice of extreme events, and found results that were qualitatively similar (reported in the Appendix). Other modifications and sensitivity checks are possible. For example, we could also define extreme events to be different compounds of cases considered separately here: a "bad day" would be one where both the Indian stock market and the US stock market fall by a large amount. The event study approach adopted here has the twin advantages of flexibility of specification and the ability to focus on extreme situations that worry policymakers the most (at least in the short run). We suggest that this approach can also be useful in considering other countries' data and other kinds of extreme events.
